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Jose Gabriel Palma has identified an important empirical regularity that has 
not been recognized in the past: the share of the middle is relatively constant 
across countries. He doesn't really provide an explanation of this regularity, 
but even without such an explanation, it should be clear that it's an important 
empirical observation with implications for both empirical work and policy. 
It says that the Gini coefficient may not best capture what is really going on 
when making comparisons of distributions across countries or over time. In the 
case of any measure, the focus ought to be on where there is variability and if 
this regularity is really true in the way that he has described it, then it means 
that variability can be found in the share at the top and the share at the very 
bottom. The middle, he demonstrates, just takes the same fraction of the pie. 
Differences across countries are, thus1 to be found in the ratio of the shar~ at 
the top to that at the bottom. 
This has led to a very interesting discussion on the post-Millennium 
Development Goals, post-2015 agenda. Given the importance being ascribed 
globally to inequality, one suggestion has been that there ought to be a goal 
of reducing extreme inequality. The Palma ratio has been put forward as the 
metric that shol)ld be used, because that ratio really captures what is going on 
in inequality at the extremes - and movement in the extremes is where all the 
11 action11 is. 
Palma's paper in this volume raises some very deep questions about the 
determination of inequality. There is no theory, at least none based on the 
standard neoclassical model, which provides any explanation for why differ-
ent countries have these very different patterns at the top and bottom, just as 
there is really no theory that can explain why the share of the middle should 
be so constant. Palma argl!eS very strongly, and I think convincingly, that the 
neoclassical model does not provide a good way of interpreting what is going 
on
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and that one needs other models. However, I'm a bit more receptive to the 
use of neoclassical models as a benchmark than Palma. I believe that it is useful 
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to begin the analysis by explaining to what extent the neoclassical model does 
or does not provide an explanation, and, to the extent that the neoclassical 
1nodel fails, to determine where it goes wrong or where it is simply inadequate. 
In fact, though he dismisses the neoclassical model, he uses it in a very force-
ful way - to argue that education is not the critical variable, as many analyses 
of income distribution using the neoclassical approach conclude. He points 
out that looking across countries, there is diversity in the education provided 
to the middle, and yet there is uniformity in the share of national income 
that goes to the middle. By contrast, those at the top all across the world are 
well educated1 and those at the bottom have very poor education, and yet it 
is at the extremes that one finds the diversity of outcomes. This suggests that 
education is not really the explanatory variable that can provide an answer to 
the question of why countries differ so much in the distribution of income. His 
analysis is persuasive. 
What I think plays a more important role - and Palma hints at this - is rent-
seeking. The standard neoclassical model foauses on marginal productivity 
theory, assuming a competitive equilibrium. It is clear1 however, that there's 
something else going on. There is a whole set of deviations from the standard 
competitive equilibrium, which give rise to income sources that can broadly 
be described as 11rents1 11 as I discuss in my contribution to this volume. These 
include monopoly rents, the rents accruing to CEOs as a result of their ability to 
take advantage of imperfections in corporate governance to divert corporate rev-
enues to their own benefit, and the rents accrui11g to the financial system. The 
worst forms of rents are associated with moving money from the very poor to the 
very rich, as occurs when banks engage in predatory lending and abusive credit 
card practices. Understanding how these rents are generated, and 11ow changes 
in the economy and in politics can lead to a change in these rents1 is vital to 
understanding these extremes of inequality and hovv they change over time. 
Palma also touched on one topic in his paper: the existence of a ratchet 
effect. There are certain periods when inequality increases, but then doesn't 
go down again at the termination of the "episode. 11 That is something that has 
been observed in the United States: In the late 1970s and early 1980s we had 
a ratcheting up of inequality at the top; this showed up as an increase in the 
Palma ratio. There was no change in the pace of globalization at the time 
that could account for this, nor was there any major change in technology in 
that short period of time. Moreover, both these forces (changes in technology 
and changes in globalization) were global. 
My interpretation of what happened in that episode was that it was a period 
of high inflation in which wages did not keep up. The CEOs discovered that 
they were able to seize a larger fraction of the corporate pie for themselves. 
Unsurprisingly, they then decided that that this was not a bad situation and 
worked to keep it this way. These changes cannot be explained by conventional 
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neoclassical theory; they cannot be explained in terms of skill-biased technical 
change or in terms of globalization. New norms were created; and even the old 
CEOs in the 1950s and 1960s looked - perhaps with a little envy - on what 
had happened to their successors, and said it was wrong. They had been indoc-
trinated with the old norms, and they said what's going on was "not right. 11 
The most fundamental point of Palma's paper is to attribute the differences 
in outcomes to differences in what he refers to as the "political settlement". 
I absolutely agree that it is not just economics that is determining the 
outcomes - economic forces are operating everywhere, but there are neverw 
theless very marked differences in the outcomes across countries. (This was 
one of the main points that I raised in my books The Price of Inequality and The 
Great Divide.) 
But there is still the crucial question of how we should explain these differ-
ences in the political settlement. Why are the political settlements in South 
America and South Africa so different from those observed in the rest of the 
world? And in answering it, one has to go beyond economics and into politics 
and sociology. Palma does provide some suggestions as to why it might be 
the case that the Latin American 11settlement11 entailed more inequality than 
elsewhere. But his analysis does not explain why among the OECD countries 
there are such large differences; why, for instance1 the political settlement in 
the United States has so much higher levels of inequality than in Scandinavia. 
In coming to terms with why countries might differ so much in their levels 
of inequality, one has to distinguish between inequalities in market income, 
and inequalities in after~tax and transfer income. Most analyses invoke standw 
ard neoclassical theory to explain market income; and then there is a political 
process that translates market income into disposable income, into what indiw 
victuals actually have to spend (into income after taxes and transfers). There are 
differences across countries in the distribution of market income - explained, 
at least in part, by differences in the rents to which I referred earlier, but there 
are also marked differences in how the tax and transfer systems work. For 
instance, the United States has a high level of market income inequality, but 
what really distinguishes the United States is that it doesn't correct for the 
inequalities in market income, which then leads to a high level of inequality 
in income after taxes and transfers. Both aspects of inequality have to do with 
the political system. 
Finally, this discussion provides an interesting segu.e into thinking about 
some of the issues that were raised by Piketty's analysis concerning the nature 
of capitalis1n1 and in particular whether inequality is inevitably associated with 
capitalism. The fact that there is such diversity of outcomes, all within market 
economies, suggest that inequality is not an inherent property of capitalism. 
Inequality really has something to do with the political system, and that is 
where we ought to be focusing our attention. But it's also the case that Palma1s 
analysis, by critiquing the ability of the neoclassical model to explain what's 
going on, implies that Piketty1s theoretical analysis, which relies heavily on 
a neoclassical model1 is misguided. I concur with Palma that there are limits 
on the neoclassical model, but I think there are important extensions of that 
model, incorporating land and credit, which can provide further insights into 
the distribution of income and wealth among individuals. My paper in this 
volume attempts to provide such an analysis. 
